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ARGUMENT 
I. Grossen Has Misstated the Standard of Review, Mis-
characterized the Issues Presented for Review and Has 
Ignored the Fact That this Case is on Appeal from a 
Directed Verdict. 
In Grossen's standard of appellate review he cites 
Grayson Limited Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 
(Utah 1989), and Mackay v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 
1995), and claims that when the court makes findings of fact 
they should be upheld on appeal unless "clearly erroneous." 
This argument clearly mischaracterizes the issues in this 
case. The issues presented in the DeWitts' brief are legal 
and not factual. 
Although Grossen tries to characterize these issues as 
factual the trial judge made both findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. It is in the conclusions of law section 
that all of the issues presented appear (R. 311-10). 
Conclusion number one grants Grossen's motion for a directed 
verdict on the ground that an oral agreement to cure a 
default is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds 
(R. 311). This is clearly an issue of law which should be 
reviewed under a correction of error standard. The 
existence of a contract is also a question of law, which 
should be reviewed under a correction of error standard. 
Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 582 (Utah 1998)(citing 
Wadsworth Const, v. St. George, 865 P.2d 1373, 1375 (Utah 
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Ct. App. 1993) aff'd 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1995)). 
Grossen also ignores the fact that this case came up on 
appeal from a directed verdict (R. 311). The standard of 
review for an appeal from a directed verdict is found in 
Management Comm. Of Graystone Pine Homeowners Ass'n v. 
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). A directed 
verdict is only appropriate when the court is able to 
conclude, as a matter of law, that reasonable minds would 
not differ on the facts to be determined form the evidence 
presented. The standard requires the evidence to be 
examined in the light most favorable to the losing party, 
and if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in 
the inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support 
judgment in favor of the losing party, the directed verdict 
cannot be sustained. Id.; See also Anderson v. Gribble, 
513 P.2d 432 (1973). The appellate court will "reverse a 
directed verdict when the evidence, taken in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, is sufficient to permit a 
reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant." Nay v. General 
Motors Copr., 850 P.2d 1260, 1263 (Utah 1993)(cited in Child 
v. Gonda, 354 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 23 (Utah 1998)). 
Finally, the DeWitts have claimed that the lis pendens 
should remain valid pending the appeal. This issue was also 
disposed of in the conclusions of law rather than the 
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findings of inrt \?. 311i, Furthermore, whether a court may 
grant a pai L , ' , Mjque:.ltnJ icln t linn I i , pendens is a 
question of law which, an appellate court reviews for 
(.iiiiecth, i :: M i n g i, inference tr" N m trial court. 
Timm v. Dewsr .», - . * : - . . 
S t a t e •-. : ^  _ ~- - ~ '-- - - * <-<fi '7* .'i 
II The DeWitt-Grossen Agreeiru 
Writing to be Enforced. 
A. The Dewitt-Grosser ,,aemi: • «s Not Need to Be 
i Writing Because it Does N 'Create Power Over* 
or .oncerm r.cr Property 
Grossen claims tnar trje agreement reached between he 
din I „u-*- . -.*- * * concern: T T land and, 
therefore, covered £>y Lie SicLuLe of Frauds. .can _ d e 
amended § 25-5-1 provides ^hat xx\* ~ estate or 
interest in . eal property , nor jup, IMK.I U IJHWWJ "\'et: 
or concerning real property or in any manner related 
thereto, s 1" : eated, g:i : an 1:e :1 assi gi Ie • :i, si ] rrendered or 
declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by 
deed i w^^yanr^ in writing subscribed by the party 
creating^ granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring Mi 
same . . . 
Grossen char etc Lei i .-^ . i ir dgreemenr betw^Pi, h^ .MI I 
Ogden DeWitt as an agreement to "surrender" -J "power over or 
CMficei n J in i I property'7 which would fall under the Statute 
of Frauds (Brief of Appellee at page 9 ) , However, it is 
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clear from the terms of the agreement that no power was 
surrendered. The terms are as follows: Grossen agreed to 
cancel the trustee's sale, and notice of default. In 
exchange, Ogden DeWitt agreed to 1) make the back payments, 
2) pay the back property taxes, and 3)insure the property. 
(See Appellee's brief pages 19-20). This is merely an 
agreement to cure a default. Grossen retained all of the 
rights he received under the trust deed. 
Allen v. Kinadon, 723 P.2d 394 (Utah 1986), is a case 
which illustrates the types of powers over and concerning 
land to which Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended § 25-5-1 
refers. This case deals with the surrender of the buyers 
interest in a home under an earnest money agreement. Id. at 
396. In the same case the court also cites to Cutwriaht v. 
Union Savings & Investment Co., 94 P. 984 (1908), which 
deals with the surrender of possession. No such surrender 
was made in this case. 
Grossen did not surrender the power to hold a trustee's 
sale or issue a notice of default. He entered into an 
agreement which, had he not breached it, would have cured 
the default and made a trustee's sale unnecessary. Grossen 
clearly still had the power to issue a notice of default and 
to hold a trustee's sale should a future default accure. 
Neither of these powers was surrendered. If, as Grossen 
claimed, he later discovered another breach of the deed of 
-4-
trust ^- ""-• ' •=• -; issuea anjiher notice of default and 
h e . • • > . * ' ' ,-^  -v. -.
 r ~: the 
agreement to cure the aerauit ne raa reacnea w_.;.n Ogaen 
EK--" :- • ;use wouia have been LO issue another 
notice ci deiaui:. 
Grossen also ci tes to a case whi ch states, "if the 
original a g r e e m e n t :i s ; :i 11 i i i 1 11: i e S t a 1: u t e : • f E " r a i I d s a 
subsequent agreement that modifies any of the material parts 
o~ * " ^ - the statute,"'7 Allen v. 
Kinadon, 723 P.2d 394, 396 (Utah 1996). Again Grossen mis-
characterizes the agreement. The tri al court di d not 
characterize the agreement as urn. I ' iiuudiL;/ Llitj I i u, 1 ill ^ d. 
None of the terms of the deed of trust were changed by the 
ayieenteJii , Th I r ] ' \ i separate agreemei I t t : ::i ire the 
default. If anything this agreement was one that would 
}ii inn t hr DeWitts into compliance with the trust deed. 
In support of this argument Grossen also cites hai id Co. 
v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 105 (Utah 1986). This case is 
inappes : , .-. . : r •. r. • > * e 
or rescind a contract, an obvious modification of the prior 
~ Zion's Properties, Inc. v. 
Holt, 538 P , Combined Metals, inc. 
v. Bastain,, 267 P. 1020 (Utah 1928). Both of these cases 
involved major modifications "t t IK iiidt.Hi I .I I I i i in Tin 
former involved an alleged oral modification which would 
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have reduced the payments. Zion, 538 P.2d at 1322. The 
latter involved an alleged oral agreement to delay operation 
of the whole contract pending an investigation by one of the 
parties. Combined Metals, 267 P. at 1031. Again, this is a 
separate agreement regarding a cure of a default that had no 
affect on the underlying trust deed. 
Grossen also claims that because the notice of default 
is required to be in writing any agreement to cure a default 
must be in writing. Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended § 57-1-
31(1) sets forth the procedures for curing a default after a 
notice of default has issued. Nowhere does the statute 
require a trustor who has defaulted to make any writing. 
All that is required is performance — a tender of the money 
necessary to cure the default. 
The policy behind the statute of frauds is also 
relevant. Generally, the statute is used as a shield to 
protect a party from paying money on an oral contract which 
he or she has not agreed to. It is the party seeking to 
collect on an alleged debt that is prevented from 
collecting. In this case Grossen is attempting to use the 
statute as a sword to prevent DeWitt from paying money to 
cure a default. The policies behind the statute of frauds 
are not served by allowing Grossen to use the statute as a 
sword to deprive DeWitt of the benefit he had bargained for. 
-6-
r>. , ^itt-Grcssen agreement Does Nc Jnder 
Statute f Frauds Because 1 *• is a:. Original as 
,.sed tc a Collateral Agreeme: * r * " *  s^er r^i 
t ' *7 b **" * *-*/-+- "h a r* 
In support cr :::s contention that the DeWitt-Grossen 
agr^m- - * • the statute cf frauds Grosser) asserts 
Utah Code An:.,, . J^J as amended &z.c~ ^  i Jes 
tha+ a rroirl" +-^  x-^^^r f v vie debt cf another must be in 
W I . L . ^ M 3U~w~l _*-•_ - ' fCl'; ' JW'T
 f 
the Utah Supreme court has determined that in order for the 
sL.iti.it*1 i'l In riiui is t"' iipi"!,, tii a aqreement to answer for the 
debt of another it must be collateral as opposed l:o 
ci :-:- "Miail v. Kounalis, 463 P.2d ^ 9 , 301 (Utah 
19 70), see also Sugar v. Miller, jit I , _j ooZ ;"JLdh 1US , . 
The test; used by the Utah Supreme Court to determine 
whether the piumiot- UJ, IU LIJIH.I1 1 Literal -i : , "PM the 
parties understand that the seller was extending credit 
. i in MI r'H'iit i if I hp p u t " -^uqht to be charged, or to him 
only as a guarantor of payment should another fail to pay.." 
lo -itina Eilertsen v. Weber, 255 P.2d 150, 155 
{ . ^ J^ _tnei v, • , » i ' | in'in i < iiidkt,. '. J 
surety or guarantor for another, it is within the statute; 
;i i i i ' r'ja* * " | " MTI:I» , > o^p-ne]|M i ! + yf j_t does not. ' 72 Am. 
J U L . 2d Statute of Frauds § JbU (1964) icitations omitted). 
II i i iener ri 1 I , In hi 1 IhiL if thr purpose of the promisor is 
to further his own interest rather then to merely underwrite 
the debt of another, it is an original undertaking not 
within the statute of frauds. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc. 
v. Western Coop. Hatch. 242 F. 2d 567 (10th Cir. 1957). 
The evidence before the trial court shows that this was 
a primary responsibility undertaken by Ogden DeWitt to pay a 
specified amount. The agreement was between Grossen and 
Ogden DeWitt. Ogden DeWitt was not to act solely as a 
surety or a guarantor for the money owed on the deed of 
trust. Grossen testified that one of the reasons her called 
the "deal" off was that he was upset that "the property had 
been transferred to Mr. Ogden DeWitt without [Grossen's] 
knowledge." (Line 9 of page 14 of Grossen's deposition.) 
The fact that this was an original rather than a collateral 
agreement is also evidenced by the fact that Ogden DeWitt 
tendered the back payments as per the agreement and did not 
wait to see if they would be paid by his brother. 
If, however, the court finds that the relationship is 
not clearly an original one, it must remand to the trial 
court. The Supreme Court of Utah held in 0'Hair that the 
question of whether or not there is an original promise 
under a given set of circumstances depends on the intention 
of the parties which is a question of fact for determination 
by the fact finder. O'Hair v. Kounalis, 463 P.2d at 801. 
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C. Part Performance of The Oral Agreement Was 
Sufficient to Exempt the Agreement from the Effect 
of the Statute of Frauds. 
Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, § 25-5-8 states that, 
"[n]othing in this chapter contained shall be construed to 
abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific 
performance of agreements in case of part performance 
thereof." 
In Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Company, 305 P.2d 480 
(Utah 1956), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the 
requirements for removing an oral contract from the statute 
of frauds. 
First, the oral contract and its terms must be 
clear and definite; second, the act done in 
performance of the contract must be equally clear 
and definite; and third, the acts must be in 
reliance on the contract. Such acts in reliance 
must be such that a) they would not have been 
performed had the contract not existed, and b) the 
failure to perform would result in a fraud on the 
performer who relied, since damages would be 
inadequate. 
Id. at 484. The oral agreement between Ogden DeWitt and 
Grossen satisfies all three of these requirements. 
The terms of the agreement are set forth plainly in the 
trial court's second findings of fact (R. 313, paragraphs 6-
8). Ogden DeWitt agreed to pay the arrearages on the trust 
deed in the amount of $1,617, in two payments, one of $1,000 
by the following Monday, and one of $617 paid by the end of 
the next week. Ogden DeWitt also agreed to pay the back 
-9-
property tax and to insure the property. There is only 
disagreement as to the timing of the payment of back taxes 
and insurance. Ogden DeWitt testified at page 688 of the 
record (line 12) that he would "make sure those [payments 
for taxes and insurance] get taken care of over the next two 
months." But, these are not essential terms and can be 
supplied by the court. In Christensen v. Christensen, 339 
P.2d 101 (Utah 1959) the court was faced with a similar 
situation. The court found that the only uncertainty in 
the contract was the timing of payment which "necessarily is 
implied and calls for performance within a reasonable time. 
. ." Id. at 104. Furthermore, the court held that the 
"defendants waived any defense as to uncertainty of time of 
payment . . . by repeatedly accepting the services and 
livestock which . . . were rendered and delivered under the 
contract." Id. There is some question as to whether an 
express time for the payment of the taxes and insurance was 
set forth. Ogden DeWitt testified payments for taxes and 
insurance were to be done within two months (R. 866:13). 
Grossen at first testified taxes and insurance were not 
discussed as part of the deal (R. 502:12; 501:25; 499:5). 
Later Grossen testified taxes and insurance were discussed 
and they had to be paid immediately. Since this was decided 
on a directly verdict, the facts should be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the DeWitts; namely, taxes and 
-10-
insurance were to be paid within two months. 
The acts done by DeWitt were also clear and definite, 
and were exclusively referable to the oral agreement. 
DeWitt would not have paid Grossen $1,617 if there had not 
been an agreement. There is also no dispute as to whether 
Grossen knew the payments were made in reliance on the 
agreement. At trial, under oath, Grossen admitted that he 
accepted the checks as payments under the agreement. (Page 
8 of appellant's brief, R. 466). 
Grossen's failure to perform has also resulted in a 
fraud because damages would not be adequate to make the 
DeWitts whole. It is well settled that real property is 
unique and cannot be adequately compensated for with 
monetary damages. Utah D.O.T. v. 6200 South Assoc, 872 
P.2d 462, 467 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (real estate has always 
been considered unique because no two parcels can be exactly 
alike) citing Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. 
Mitsui Investment. Inc., 522 P.2d 1370, 1373 (Utah 1974). 
See also, 5A Corbin on Contracts 1143, at 126 (1964) (noting 
that specific performance is an appropriate remedy in a 
contract case involving real estate because land is unique). 
Grossen also claims that the part performance exception 
to the statute of frauds only applies where there has been 
substantial part performance over a significant period of 
time. He apparently inferred this requirement from the fact 
-11-
that contracts for the sale of land generally involve large 
amounts of money paid over a relatively long period of time. 
Unfortunately, he cannot cite a single case which has 
adopted the rule he would have this court follow. If his 
contention were true it would not be possible to take a 
contract out of the statute of frauds where the time for 
performance was short or the amount at stake was small. The 
requirements set forth above in Randall do not require the 
part performance to extend over a specific period of time 
nor is a specific dollar amount set forth. The sufficiency 
of the part performance should be viewed in relationship to 
the agreement which has been relied on. In the case at bar 
DeWitt had already payed $1,617 in reliance on the contract. 
The back taxes amounted to approximately $1,300, including 
penalty and interest. Even with the added cost of fire 
insurance on the home, DeWitt had already tendered more than 
half of the amount due in reliance on the contract. One 
half of the total amount owing on the contract is sufficient 
to take the contract out of the statute of frauds based on 
part performance. 
The supreme court in In Re Roth's Estate, 269 P.2d 278 
(Utah 1954), determined that where the party seeking 
specific performance of a contract for the sale of land had 
"paid nearly one-half of the purchase price and made 
valuable improvements on the property," the evidence 
-12-
justified a decree of specific performance based on part 
performance. Similarly, the Utah courts have held that 
where the oral agreement was for the sale of seven lots, a 
down payment and two interest payments as well as full 
payment for three of the seven lots was sufficient part 
performance to take the agreement out of the statute of 
frauds. Baldwin v. Vantage Corp., 676 P.2d 413, 417 (Utah 
1984). 
Grossen also claims that the trial court determined in 
its findings of fact that Ogden DeWitt's actions were 
insufficient to establish the partial performance exception 
to the statute of frauds. This argument is disingenuous. 
Grossen's counsel is trying to rewrite the court's findings. 
There was never a finding stating there was insufficient 
facts to establish part performance or estoppel. Nowhere in 
the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is the 
doctrine of part performance even mentioned. (R. 315.) The 
trial court also made no such finding in its Ruling dated 
September 5, 1997. (R. 308.) At page 624, line 24, of the 
record the trial court says, "I don't think part performance 
has application." The trial court continued at page 623, 
line 7: 
I don't believe that part performance, being the 
payment of checks by Mr. Ogden, satisfies the 
Statute of Frauds, insofar as the requirement that 
there be a written modification to any written 
Notice of Default. I think part — I simply deny 
-13-
relief under the doctrine of part performance. 
On page 19 of Grossen's brief he claims that "The trial 
court ruled that accepting, but not cashing, 2 checks for 
three weeks paid by one with no interest in the property is 
not sufficient partial performance, especially where 
insurance was not obtained and back taxes were not paid as 
agreed." Grossen cites no authority for this claim 
undoubtedly because there is no authority for the claim. 
This statement cannot be found in the Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 315) or in the Ruling dated 
September 5, 1997. (R. 308.) 
As part of this argument, Grossen contends that the 
issues of part performance and estoppel are factual issues 
which should only be reversed on appeal if clearly 
erroneous. (Appellee's brief page 14). But, as has already 
been shown, these are issues of law and there is no dispute 
as to the facts other than the timing of the payment for 
taxes and insurance. Also, this appeal is one from a 
directed verdict where the evidence must be examined in the 
light most favorable to the losing party, and if there is a 
reasonable basis in the evidence and in the inferences to be 
drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in favor of 
the losing party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained. 
Management C O M , of Graystone Pines Homeowners Ass'n v. 
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982) . 
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Although Grossen criticizes Dewitt's use of the 
article, The Doctrine of Part Performance as Applied to Oral 
Land Contracts in Utah, 9 Utah L. Rev. 106 (1964), the Utah 
Supreme Court found it persuasive enough to cite in Martin 
v, Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275-76 (Utah 1983). Grossen also 
claims that the quoted section refers to the terms of an 
oral agreement, not the actual existence of the agreement. 
This distinction is not significant because Grossen has 
admitted the existence of the agreement over and over. (See 
Appellant's brief pages 7 and 8). 
III. Grossen's Breach of the Dewitt-Grossen Agreement Did 
Not Allow Ogden Dewitt to Fully Perform Under the 
Agreement. 
On page 19 of Grossen's brief he sets forth the terms 
of the agreement between he and Ogden DeWitt, "In exchange 
for Earl Grossen canceling the trustee's sale and canceling 
the Notice of Default, Ogden DeWitt also agreed to 
immediately bring current any and all taxes and to insure 
the property." He then claims that Ogden DeWitt failed to 
fully perform under the contract. However, as already 
argued in section II (c) of this brief, the only 
disagreement over the terms of the agreement was the timing 
of the payment of back taxes and insurance on the house. 
When viewed in the light most favorable to the DeWitt's, as 
required for a directed verdict, the DeWitt's had two months 
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to get the taxes and insurance paid (R. 688). After 
accepting payment under the agreement and before the time 
had elapsed, Grossen told Ogden DeWitt that the deal was 
off. 
Grossen also urges that the agreement was not "clear 
and definite" enough to be enforceable. That is a strange 
argument since the terms of the agreement are outlined in 
both the trial court's Second Findings of Fact (R. 313) and 
in Grossen's own brief (See Facts, paragraph 7, and on pages 
19 and 20). DeWitt's dispute that the taxes and insurance 
had to be paid immediately, but there is no dispute as to 
the rest of the terms. Most importantly the agreement 
fulfills all of the requirements set forth in Randall v. 
Tracy Collins Trust Co., 305 P.2d 480 (1956). (See Part II 
(c) of this brief.) 
IV. Section 57-1-31 is Applicable to This Case. 
Grossen has waived any right he has to claim that Utah 
code § 57-1-31 does not apply in this case because he raises 
the argument for the first time on appeal. Issues not 
raised at trial cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994). 
At no time at the trial level did Grossen claim that § 57-1-
31 did not apply. 
As a matter of fact, claiming that § 57-1-31 does not 
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apply in this case would pull the proverbial rug out from 
under Grossenf s argument that the agreement between he and 
DeWitt is required to be in writing under the statute of 
frauds. At trial the judge said that "that section does 
apply in this case" and since that section required a 
recorded notice of default to be in writing, any agreement 
to cure the default must also be in writing. (R. 652:5.) If 
this section does not apply, the basis for the judge's 
reasoning falls apart. 
V. Grossen Has Waived His Right to Claim the Three Month 
Limitation in § 57-1-31 by Accepting Payment of the 
$1,617. 
While it is true that § 57-1-31 gives a trustor a 
statutory right to cure a default within three months of a 
notice of default, it does not prohibit a trustor from 
curing after that time. The Utah Supreme Court and this 
Court have recognized that acceptance of rental payments may 
constitute waiver of a claim of breach. Olympus Hills 
Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food, 889 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994); Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain 
Theatres, Inc., 560 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1977). This 
reasoning is also applicable to this case. Grossen not only 
accepted back payments on the trust deed he also accepted 
February's payment. (See Trial Exhibit #30, copies of checks 
tendered to Grossen.) After agreeing to take these payments 
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as a cure to the default, Grossen should not be allowed to 
claim that there was no right to cure the default. His 
actions are a clear waiver of any statutory limitation on 
the time allowed to cure the default. 
VI. This Court Does Have Jurisdiction in This Matter 
Because Appeal is Taken From the Amended Findings. 
It is true that the original judgment in this matter 
was filed on May 7, 1997, and that the DeWitt's Rule 52(b) 
motion was denied. However, despite the fact that the 
DeWitt's 52(b) motion was denied, Grossen's counsel 
submitted a brand new set of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which bore little resemblance to the 
original findings and conclusions originally signed on May 
6, 1997. This new set of findings deletes eight findings 
previously entered by the trial court. (See Defendant's 
Rule 52(b) Motion to Strike Findings Not Authorized by the 
Court, including copies of both the original(R. 228-232) and 
amended findings (R. 311-315), attached hereto as Exhibit 
B). The new findings also added 12 new paragraphs 
containing findings that were not in the original May 6, 
findings signed by the court. (See Exhibit B). None of the 
issues addressed by the new findings were discussed in any 
of the Rule 52(b) motion pleadings, so there was no basis 
for the wholesale revision of the court's previous findings. 
The new findings signed by the trial judge on September 
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25, 1997, also contradict the original findings filed by the 
c o i :i i: I: a i I ::i d. e in D I i s 1: i a t e d t: 1 I B C :: i I f i I s :i :) i I a s t : • !: 1 I a J e :j a 1 
conclusions and the status of the court ruling. For 
i n s t a. n c e t h e f :i r s 1: s e t :> f f :i i i ::i :i i I :j s o f f a :: 1: a i i d c o n c J: i I s i o n s 
of law stated that "Earl Grossen and Ogden DeWitt reached an 
agreement regardina the payment of the arrearage fP. 
231.) But the new i_:.u-ngs adaec a new v . .: •-:.-j;. _:._.:.j-. J 
the whole meaning of the sentence • :. w reads, xxEarl 
Grossei i a.i i ::i 0 g d e n DeWi 11: i: e a c h e d . :cui» u.^  v<= a g r e e m e n t 
regarding the payment of the arrearage F 313, ) 
F i i r t h e r m o i e 11 :n :i s a g r e e m e n t c a n n c t I: e a t e n t a t :i A r e a g r e e m e n f . 
As argued above the terms of the agreement are clear and not 
in dispute. After negotiating the terms of the agreement 
Ogden DeWitt accepted the terms by tendering the back 
payments. :.~e Grossen accepted the tender, the agreement 
Paragrapn 7 of rne original findings of facts and 
conclusions of law state that "because of the courts ruling 
on the statute of frauds issue, the court did not make 
further findings of fact as to what the terms of the 
a g r e e in e :r i I: ^ e i: e (I : 2 3 0 ) H o w e v e :i : 1:1: i e a m e n d e il f i n d i n g s 
and conclusions ignore that court's previous statements and 
go : n tc specifically state the terms of the agreement. The 
amended findings and conclusions include time requirements 
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on which the agreement was based (R. 313) and include a 
multitude of new paragraphs which add new facts regarding 
Mr. Grossen's beliefs as to the other violations of the 
trust deed and telephone calls made to Ogden DeWitt. 
Since no evidence was taken between the May 6th 
findings and the new findings there was no basis for 
Grossen's counsel rewriting the findings, in fact he had 
received no authorization from the court to do so. It is 
disingenuous for Grossen's counsel to make wholesale changes 
to a signed set of findings of fact, ask the court to sign 
the new findings, include the new findings as an exhibit in 
Grossen's brief, argue from the new set of findings, and 
then claim that the DeWitt's appeal is untimely because it 
should have been taken from the first set of findings. The 
new set of findings was not signed until September 24, 1997. 
It was from the new set of findings that the DeWitts have 
taken their appeal. It is from the second set of findings 
that Grossen has argued his case. It is simply wrong for 
Grossen to claim that the DeWitts should have filed an 
appeal before the final judgment and the Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law were ever signed. 
Conclusion 
The issues presented for review by this appeal are 
issues of law. The appeal is taken from legal conclusions 
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made by the trial court that can be found in the conclusions 
of I a/1! ; s e c t i c •: 1 • :: f tl le Ainei ided "i: " i i K l i i : T< :> 1 I "a, ::t ai id 
Conclusions of Law (R , 31 1 ) Because Lhey are issues of law 
this co i i r t s h o i i ] d r e v :i e x ; 1:1 I e c o n c J I i s :i : n s f c i: c o r r e c t ri e s s a n d 
should grant no deference to the trial court's conclusions. 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 87 0 
P. 2 ::I 880, 8 85 ;t : 1:ii il l 3 9 93) . 
Furthermore, this is an appeal from, a directed verdict 
wh e r e 1:1 i = ev i den c e i s ex c. - d :i i I 1:1: i . . 1 11: rnc s t f a^ K: • r a b 1 e 
to the losing party and if there is a reasonable basis in 
the evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom 
that would support judgment in favor of the losing party, 
the directed verdict cannot be sustained. Management Comm. 
of Graystone E Ine Homeowners Ass'i I v Graystoi le Pines, Inc., 
652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). 
The Dewitt-Grossen agreement does - ->•-' 
statute of frauds and therefore does ;uL need to oe in 
writing to be enforced. The agreement does not require 
Gr ossei I I:c • sur: r ei ider power over or concerning the property. 
Grossen retained all of his power over the land under the 
• •-•'
j
" ' - - ssen 
agreement was aj- original db opposed to a collateral 
agreement to answer for the debt of another, Odgen DeWitt 
did not agree to become only a surety for Derel Dewitt, He 
also took on primary responsibility for the agreement to 
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cure the default. Ogden DeWitt's tender and Grossen's 
acceptance of the checks pursuant to the agreement was also 
sufficient to exempt the agreement from the effect of the 
statute of frauds. Moreover, it was Grossen's breach of the 
DeWitt-Grossen agreement which did not allow Ogden DeWitt to 
fully perform under the agreement. 
Although Grossen contends that § 57-1-31 is not 
applicable to this case, he has raised this argument for the 
first time on appeal and, therefore, has waived his right to 
make that claim. Section 57-1-31 is also the statutory 
basis for reinstating a mortgage. By accepting tender of 
the back payments Grossen took sufficient action to 
reinstate the trust deed. However, by making a "deal" and 
accepting payment of the $1,617 after the three month 
limitation in § 57-1-31, Grossen has waived his right to 
claim that three month limitation, and the Court should 
recognize an effective cure of the default. Finally, this 
court does have jurisdiction in this matter because this 
appeal is from the final judgment in this matter, which is 
the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law signed 
by the trial court on September 24, 1997. 
In light of the above arguments, the DeWitts ask this 
Court to find as a matter of law that: 1) a cure of a 
default need not be in writing to be effective - a cure of a 
default can occur by performance; 2) that even if a cure of 
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a default falls under the statute of frauds, the DeWitts' 
part perforrii.in••>> w,-is r.iiffji ieiil In Ldke the contract out of 
the statute of frauds; 3) the directed verdict against the 
DeWitts should be vacated ox i the basi s of par t: per forinance 
and estoppel; and 4) a lis pendens remains valid during the 
pendency of an appeal. 
DATED t. : o?_ day of fJ^^„J^\ 1998. 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
£n.<t*n Qu^9.^ 
GORDON W. DUVAL 
Attorney for Appellants 
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Page 13 
Q And on that occasion, could you explain what 
happened, how the default was cured or — 
A The details of this are in these papers. 
Q Okay. 
A And there's a promissory note there signed 
by Afton Dewitt and Derrick Dewitt and I think it's | 
dated November - the 12th day of December, 1992. There 
may be one later than that. Yeah, there's one later, 
June 1993, the 1st of June, 1993, and that's signed by 
both parties. | 
Q Do you mind if Ms. Petersen takes a look at j 
these documents? And by any chance, did you bring any 
checks with you? | 
A I destroyed them. They weren't any good to 
me because he had lied to me. 
Q When did you destroy those checks? 
A And misled me. After I got through telling 
him on the phone that the deal was off — i 
Q Do you know -
A — for chicanery. 
Q Do you know what date that was? 
A Probably March or April of this year. 
Something like that. I can't recall. 
Q And when you say that the deal was off, what 
are you referring to? 
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A 1 told him that there was no deal, that I 
wasn't going to take the checks and cash them. And I 
didn't, I didn't cash any of them. 
Q Is the deal referring to his having tendered 
those checks to you --
i\ A The deal was that the back taxes weren't 
paid as they should have been, according to the 
*L\ contract, and the house had been put under a lien of 
9 ' 22,000, which I was very irate about, and the property 
VC) had been transferred to Mr. Ogden Dewitt without my 
1 
I 
\ 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
knowledge, without my information,. My attorney had to 
do research on that, David Crabtree, and he has the 
David Crabtree file, Mr. Cline. And I was very irate, 
to put it mildly, about what was going on so I told him 
the deal was off, and he knows that. 
Q And, again, do you have an approximate date 
that would have been? 
A That he gave me the last check, I think it 
was in April or March of this year. 
Q When you say last check, that's referring 
to -
A He gave me one I think for 1,000 and another 
one for 1,600 and something. And those were the back 
payments of Derrick Dewitt's rent payments or house 
payments that weren't paid. 
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Q Are you referring to Kevin Dewitt? 
A Or Kevin, yeah. Derrick had it first and 
then Kevin. 
Q Okay. Let's go back to the checks that 
you're referring to. You said that you received a check 
for SI,000? 
A As I recall it was about a thousand. 
Q Do you recall the date that you received 
that check? 
A I think it was February. Somewhere around 
in there, February or March. 
Q So you think that would have been at the end 
of February, or at the beginning of February? 
A It seems like it was towards the end of 
February. I tore the checks up and threw them away. 
They were no good to me. 
Q Did you receive that ~ did you receive that 
check or any checks prior to the trustee's sale0 
A Yes. 
Q Do you recall the date of the trustee's 
sale? 
A I think it was April 1996. I think we have 
that date. And it was advertised and Dewitts were aw 
of it. And incidentally, they didn't show up for the 
sale. 
P 
Q Who did show up for the sale? 
A Mr. Crabtree. my attorney at the time. 
Q So Mr. Crabtree was the attorney that 
conducted the sale? 
A David Crabtree, right. And there's a copy 
of the sale. 
Q Do you know who Scott Ryther is? 
A I don't have a clue. 
Q Okay. So you destroyed the checks that you 
received; is that true? 
A And I told you why. 
Q Do you know how Mr. Ogden Dewitt arrived 
the figures that the checks were written out for? 
A As I recall, he came to those totals that 
the checks were written for to make up for back payr 
that had not been paid on the property. And there v/< 
a whole bunch of payments since then that weren't rr 
Q Did it include any other fees or charges? 
A Not that I can recall. I don't think it 
did. And if it did, it wasn't made clear. 
Q And so you stated earlier that as of 
December, you believe that it was seven or eight moi 
in arrearage, the property? 
A I don't remember exactly how many months 
would have to go back and calculate. I don't know 
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